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Articles

REVENGE OF THE TRIPLE NEGATIVE: A
NOTE ON THE BRANDEIS BRIEF IN
MULLER v. OREGON
Clyde Spillenger*
The legal brief filed by Louis D. Brandeis and Josephine
Goldmark in the case of Muller v. Oregon 1 -the original
"Brandeis brief"- remains a landmark in American constitutional lawyering. Of course, the brief, like the U.S. Supreme
Court's own opinion in Muller, has not worn well with everyone.
The Muller case was once regarded in conventional legal and
constitutional histories as a ray of progressive light amidst the
darkness of such decisions as Lochner and Adkins, 3 and a testament to Brandeis's brilliant legal strategy; today legal scholars
(particularly feminists and libertarians) are as likely to stress the
paternalism (or "maternalism"), indeed the unvarnished sexism,
of Justice Brewer's language concerning woman's distinctive role
of discharging the "burdens of motherhood," 4 so as to promote
"the future well-being of the race," 5 in his opinion upholding
Oregon's maximum-hours law for laundresses. And the lengthy
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. My thanks to my colleagues Alison Anderson, Stuart Banner, Ann Carlson, Gary Rowe, and Bill Rubenstein.
I. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding Oregon law limiting hours of work of women
working in laundries to ten hours per day).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (declaring unconstitutional New
York's law limiting the hours of work for bakery employees to sixty per week). Of
course, a generation of "Lochner revisionism" has rendered the traditional account of socalled "laissez-faire constitutionalism" largely obsolete.
3. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional
Congressional statute providing for establishment of minimum wage for women and
children in the District of Columbia).
4. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
5. /d. at 422.
6. See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL
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presentation of statistical studies, public health reports, and
other "social facts" in the Brandeis and Goldmark brief,7 while
perhaps a bit more nuanced than Brewer's blunt opinion, largely
prefigured Brewer's conclusions. 8 Moreover, the brief is now regarded by many scholars as relying on a highly selective presentation of "scientific" studies that by modern standards seem biased and amateurish. 9 Nevertheless, I suspect that, as a landmark
in constitutional-political advocacy, the brief retains much of its
luster, or at least importance, for historians and legal scholars.
Certainly the "Brandeis brief" has been, in many major cases, an
important weapon in the arsenal of appellate litigators, and its
immediate impact on the movement for protective labor legislation was considerable.

RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 55--67 (1978); Nancy S. Erickson, Muller
v. Oregon Reconsidered: The Origins of a Sex-Based Doctrine of Liberty of Contract, 30
LAB. HIST. 228 (1989); David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1960, 1967-70 (2003) (reviewing JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS,
PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW, AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND
NEW DEAL YEARS (2001) ). One fascinating index to the declining fortunes of the Muller
decision is that in 1991, while striking down Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy as a
violation of Title VII, the Supreme Court made a disparaging reference to Muller and the
sexist presumptions underlying the decision. See UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499
U.S. 187, 211 (1991) ("Concern for a woman's existing or potential offspring historically
has been the excuse for denying women equal employment opportunities.") (citing Muller, 208 U.S. at 412). See also Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219 (1986), cited in Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187.
Another feature of recent feminist consideration of Muller and the Brandeis brief has
been increased recognition of the important role played by Josephine Goldmark,
Brandeis's sister-in-law (and, to a lesser extent, Florence Kelley), in compiling the brief,
particularly in tracking down the numerous studies on which the brief relies. See NANCY
WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 29 (1996);
NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN, supra, at 82; OWEN M. FISS,
8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS
OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 at 175 (1993).
7. The text of the brief can be found at The Brandeis Brief, http://library.touisville.
edullaw/brandeislmuller.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006), and at Women in Industry,
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/ww/organizations-ncl.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). See also
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS & JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 113 (Arno Press
1969) (1908); 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63-178 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1975). Each of these versions are photostat copies of the original brief. The
brief is also generously excerpted in WOLOCH, supra note 6, at 109-33, although its final
paragraph is not included in that excerpt.
8. For an early example of criticism of the gender stereotypes invoked by the Muller brief, see KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 88 & n.38 (1970).
9. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91, 106 & n.63 (1993) (arguing that the Muller brief would be regarded today as "junk social science"). Rustad
and Koenig, whose real quarry is elsewhere, hasten to add that Brandeis's brief should
nevertheless be praised for breaking the formalist mold in constitutional argument. See
also FISS, supra note 6, at 179 (calling the brief a "hodgepodge" of studies).
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Let's turn for a moment to the brief itself. I ask the reader
to examine Brandeis's concluding paragraph:
CONCLUSION
We submit that in view of the facts above set forth and of
legislative action extending over a period of more than sixty
years in the leading countries of Europe, and in twenty of our
States, it cannot be said that the Legislature of Oregon had no
reasonable ground for believing that the public health, safety,
or welfare did not require a legal limitation on women's work
in manufacturing and mechanical establishments and laundries to ten hours in one day.
See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395, 397.
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
Counsel for State of Oregon.

Unless I miss my guess, you probably have found it necessary to
read this passage a second or perhaps even a third time.
I think most lawyers would agree that this was not the ideal
way of concluding one of the most important briefs ever to be
filed in the U.S. Supreme Court. It's a pretty long sentence, and
residing within it is a formidable triple negative. It evokes the
question H.L. Mencken asked after reciting a passage from Warren G. Harding's inaugural address: "What on earth does it
mean?" 10 It is hard to believe that a reputable law firm today
would allow such a brief in a major U.S. Supreme Court case to
leave the office for the printer without first ensuring that that final paragraph had been subdued and domesticated. It is true
that Brandeis's innovative strategy in his Muller brief was to
subordinate the legal argument to exposition of the "social
facts"; but that strategy had not previously been thought to entail making the legal argument's ultimate conclusion unintelligible. {Of course, some literary critics might find this a rather
clever way of making the larger proto-Realist point, performa-

10. H.L. Mencken, Gamalielese, in THE IMPOSSIBLE H.L. MENCKEN: A SELECTION
OF HIS BEST NEWSPAPER STORIES 410 (Marion Elizabeth Rodgers ed., 1991) (emphasis
added). The particular phrase in Harding's speech to which Mencken was referring was
"(t]he expressed conscience of progress."
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tively rather than propositionally, that the internal coherence of
legal doctrine is largely a mirage. But it goes without saying that
the austere Brandeis lacked both the playfulness and the "lawskepticism" to have entertained such a notion, much less incorporate it in a Supreme Court brief.)
You've probably noticed already that the real allure of
Brandeis's concluding paragraph is not its overall impenetrability but the fact that, when all the dust has settled, it ends up arguing something like the opposite of what the brief's 100 pages
of often laborious social science were supposed to be building to.
Granted, it's not literally the opposite; Brandeis, very much to
his credit, does not in this passage actually invite the Court to
strike down Oregon's law. However, according to its syntax, the
passage does attribute to the State of Oregon, Brandeis's (presumably surprised and unamused) client, the view that regulation of laundresses' working hours was unnecessary, and argues
strenuously (if somewhat chaotically) that such a view was reasonable. The contention that Oregon might reasonably (and thus
constitutionally) refrain from regulating those hours would have
provoked little disagreement from the Court, but it does sit uneasily with the remainder of the brief.''
It may be frivolous even to speculate as to whether this
eleventh-hour subversion of the logic of Brandeis's entire argument should be attributed to anything other than simple error,
produced perhaps by the shortness of time or too many late
nights at the office. But this won't take long. Thus, for example,
Brandeis does seem to have taken a sardonic view of the fact
that so much effort was required to convince the Court of the
constitutionality of the Oregon statute-in private he remarked
that the brief should have been entitled "What Any Fool
Knows" 12 -but it seems unlikely that that sense of irritation
would have led him to conclude his brief on a strange and sour
note of sarcasm: "It's entirely reasonable for Oregon to believe
that no legal regulation of the hours of laundresses is necessary.
Yeah, right. [Rolling of eyes.]"

II. The thrust of Brandeis's legal argument was, of course, quite clear from its
statement in the briefs opening pages. See pp. 9-10 of the brief, available in any of the
sources for the brief identified supra note 7 ("[T]here is reasonable ground for holding
that to permit women in Oregon to work in a 'mechanical establishment, or factory, or
laundry' more than ten hours in one day is dangerous to the public health, safety, morals,
or welfare")-still not ideal as a statement of the legal proposition, perhaps, but enough
to get the message across.
12.

DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 53 (1965).
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Alternatively, did Brandeis think that by means of his last
sentence, he might send a subliminally soothing message to those
members of the Court who had little patience with protective labor regulation, thus putting them in a better mood about reaching the result Brandeis desired? Or was he throwing sand in their
eyes, sowing just enough confusion to lead them, in desperation,
to decide in his client's favor? Doubtful.
Perhaps the brief's conclusion was a gesture in the direction
of Holmes, who after all had famously written that the life of the
law has not been logic. Unfortunately for this interpretation,
Holmes had not concluded his aphorism by saying, "Rather, the
life of the law has been the introduction by lawyers of incoherence into the structure of their arguments."
Finally, did Brandeis himself harbor a subconscious ambivalence about the position he was arguing, leading him to subvert
its thrust in his very last sentence? As satisfying as this supposition might be to psycho-historians, there is nothing in the record
to validate it, and much to refute it. Theorists of deconstruction
have often spoken of the self-subverting qualities of language,
but usually they are referring to the properties of indeterminacy
immanent in language itself, and not the phenomenon of an author suddenly and unaccountably saying the opposite of what he
has been saying.
No, that last paragraph was just a mistake, as a cigar is often
just a cigar. At all events, the mistake seems to have had no effect on anyone, either the Justices themselves or the generations
of scholars who have written about Muller and the Brandeis
brief (none of whom seems previously to have noted, or at least
called attention to, the error). 13 The overall thrust of Brandeis's
argument was known to all, and most readers of the brief, then
and now, have undoubtedly passed quickly over its final paragraph, transiently flustered by its density but with no real need
to parse it for greater understanding. Brandeis's oral argument
before the Court would in any case have swept away any ambiguities created by his brief.

13. After a literature review that was something more than cursory and something
less than exhaustive, I have found no previous reference to the error in the briefs final
paragraph. At least three studies have quoted that paragraph without noting the error.
WOLOCH, supra note 6, at 31 (noting the triple negative but not mentioning its logical
error); LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF AMERICA'S
TRULY GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 165 (1983) (quoting the paragraph without
comment); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 115 (1984).
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Still, legal historians and law teachers may now have added
reason to attend to the brief in their work. Teachers of appellate
advocacy can point to it not only as a landmark in the use of sociological data in appellate briefs, but also as an object lesson in
how not to conclude a brief and in the vital importance of careful
proofreading; nothing engages and consoles law students more
than a demonstration that even celebrated lawyers are capable
of silly and avoidable mistakes. At the same time, historians and
students of Brandeis now have further reason (albeit a minor
one) to complicate their accounts of the brief in Muller and to
show that Isaiah, too, was quite capable of nodding (perhaps literally, in the early morning hours before the brief was due). And
the fact that most people seem to have read the last paragraph as
being consistent with the rest of the brief-obviously we cannot
know this for everyone who has ever read it-confirms the views
of many cognitive psychologists as to the way in which we read
and comprehend. Or that lots of people are doing lots of skimmmg.
Further commentary on this episode would be gratuitous.
But one might hazard a final observation: It cannot be said that
Brandeis had no reasonable basis for not concluding his brief the
way he did.

